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9 Rewards for Continued Work:
The Economic Incentives for 
Postponing Retirement
Olivia S. Mitchell 
, Gary S. Fields
This chapter develops empirical measures of the economic incentives for 
deferred retirement among older workers. Using a new data file on pay 
and pensions, we construct intertemporal budget sets reflecting income 
available to workers at alternative retirement ages. The analysis explores 
how continued labor force attachment is rewarded in terms o f net earn­
ings, Social Security benefits, and private pension income.
Two motivations guide the research. First, it is important to understand 
how workers’ income opportunities change with age. Studies o f retire­
ment patterns, including our own and others’, 1 have demonstrated that 
these economic rewards influence the choice of retirement age. Savings 
decisions, consumption paths, and other economic outcomes are also re­
sponsive to the budget set at older ages. Unfortunately, data limitations 
have made it difficult for previous authors to explore the range o f income 
opportunities available to older individuals. This paper presents and dis­
cusses new empirical evidence on how older workers’ income opportuni­
ties change as the workers age.
Olivia S. Mitchell is a faculty research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Re­
search and associate professor of labor economics at Cornell University. Gary S. Fields is 
professor of economics and labor economics at Cornell University. Both authors are equally 
responsible for the contents of this paper; first mention is determined randomly.
The authors wish to thank Joseph Quinn for helpful comments, Vivian Fields for careful 
computer programming, and Rebecca Luzadis for capable research assistance. Research 
support was received from the U.S. Department of Labor, Cornell University, and the Na­
tional Bureau of Economic Research. The research reported here is part of the NBER’s re­
search program in labor studies and pensions. Any opinions expressed are those of the au­
thors.
1. Mitchell and Fields 1984; Fields and Mitchell 1984; Boskin and Hurd 1978; Burk- 
hauser and Quinn 1983; Burtless and Hausman 1982; Gordon and Blinder 1980; Gustman 
and Steinmeier 1984.
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Exploring how companies differ in the compensation packages they of­
fer to older workers is important as well. Some authors, e.g., Lazear 
(1982), have suggested that firms use their pension plans to encourage ear­
ly retirement, though data on this phenomenon are difficult to obtain. 
The present chapter develops a detailed description of private pension 
structures and the ways in which they treat prolonged job attachment.
Two main conclusions arise from the analysis. First, the data show that 
total net income rises as people defer retirement, but the size o f the income 
increment varies with age. Second, the data show that some pension plans 
encourage early retirement among older workers but others penalize it. 
Thus differences in private pension structures prove to be an important 
source of variation in income opportunities among older workers. Our re­
sults have implications for researchers interested in older workers’ income 
patterns and for policymakers who propose mandating actuarial neutral­
ity in private pension plans.
Section 9.1 o f this chapter reviews briefly the most important theoreti­
cal features o f older workers’ income opportunities and discusses some 
general considerations when building an empirical counterpart of the 
theoretical budget set. Section 9.2 presents our methodology and data, 
and section 9.3 presents the findings. Conclusions are collected in section 
9.4.
9.1 Theoretical Considerations
We consider the rewards for continued work in the context o f older per­
sons’ retirement decisions. Previous theoretical studies of retirement be­
havior have identified the individual’s problem as selecting the optimal 
amount o f work to do over the remaining lifetime, subject to income and 
time constraints.2 Optimal is defined as the labor supply path that maxi­
mizes intertemporal utility; accordingly, the goal is to select the retirement 
age that provides a worker with his most preferred combination of leisure 
time and income from among available options. The worker’s income 
constraints are determined by net earnings available from market work, 
and net Social Security and private pension benefits available during re­
tirement. His time constraint consists o f time remaining until death; this 
time may be allocated between work and leisure.3
More formally, the worker is postulated to select the retirement-age (/?) 
that maximizes intertemporal utility, the arguments o f which are lifetime 
consumption (C) and lifetime leisure (RET):
2. For a review of studies of retirement behavior, see Mitchell and Fields 1982.
3. We abstract here from retirement options involving part-time work or gradual with­
drawal from the labor force; Gustman and Steinmeier 1984 and Burtless and Moffitt 1982 
consider these alternatives in some detail. For the sample of older workers described below, 
retirement may be best described as accepting the pension and leaving the firm since only a 
tiny minority ever worked after becoming pensioners.
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U = U(C,RET); U concave,
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint with the following struc­
ture:
C = PDVY(R) + W o -  Bo.
In other words, planned consumption equals the present value of dis­
counted income over the remainder o f the individual’s life (PDVY), plus 
wealth at the time o f retirement decision ( W0), minus planned bequests 
(Bo). Survival probabilities-and pure time preference are incorporated via 
a discount factor (r). Both the lifetime utility function and the income 
constraint are viewed as stationary over time.
The PDVY  component o f the older worker’s budget constraint depends 
on the retirement age chosen. This is because PDVY  is composed o f three 
elements, each o f which is a function o f R. The present value o f earnings 
(PDVE) is computed from the age at which the worker begins planning 
for retirement (normalized to 0) until R:
R
PDVE = j Ete -r,dt. 
o
The other two components of PDVY— the discounted values o f Social Se­
curity and pension benefits—also depend on R since they are computed 
from R to the end of the planning horizon (T):
T




PDVPP = j PPte -r,dt.
R
Annual retirement benefits are fairly complex functions of several fac­
tors including the worker’s retirement age:
SS, = f(R,t,F),
PP, = g(R,t,F).
When the worker defers retirement, many firms raise annual pension 
benefits to acknowledge the shorter period over which benefits will be 
paid; when benefits are only sufficiently larger to offset increased mortal­
ity, the pension structure is termed actuarially neutral.4 As with private 
pension formulas, Social Security rules also provide a positive credit as R
4. In the empirical analysis below, we focus on defined benefit plans, i.e., those in which 
benefit amounts are functions of years of service and/or pay rather than pension contribu­
tions. Benefits in such plans need not be actuarially neutral.
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PDVY
Fig. 9.1. The intertemporal budget set (B B ') and the optimal retirement
date (/?*).
increases. Social Security and private pension benefits depend upon two 
other variables as well. The year itself, t , enters the annual benefit compu­
tation because benefits often vary with time. This would occur in the case 
of negotiated benefit improvements in bargained plans, or legislated So­
cial Security formula changes. Finally, the pension factor (F) is included 
to allow for interactions between benefits and other variables; for exam­
ple, in some pension plans, preretirement earnings are used in the benefit 
formula.
In addition to the income constraint, an older worker faces a total time 
constraint. By definition, years o f retirement leisure (RET) are equal to 
the difference between the individual’s expected lifetime (N) and the age 
at which retirement occurs:5
RET = N  -  R.
Understanding the income-leisure trade-off facing older workers is fa­
cilitated by figure 9.1. This figure graphs the present value o f income 
available to the older individual and the expected retirement period for all 
possible retirement ages; the diagram indicates that, for this hypothetical 
worker at least, his income is lowest if he chooses to retire as early as pos­
sible, while his income would rise substantially if he remained with the 
firm additional years. The figure presumes that deferring retirement is re­
warded by even more income; below we show empirically that the inter­
temporal budget set in fact has such a shape.
5. Remaining lifetime may, of course, vary with health. The empirical work below uses 
standard life expectancies in computing the average value of future income streams; howev­
er, annuities are worth less to those with shorter remaining lifespans due to poor health, and 
benefits to such retirees should be adjusted accordingly.
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Presenting the older worker’s decision in this way highlights the similar­
ities between this model and the conventional labor economics approach 
to the hours-of-work decision. Figure 9.1 also indicates that the optimal 
retirement date (R *) is determined in a familiar way: R* is the age at which 
the marginal utility of an additional increment to lifetime income is just 
offset by the loss in utility from leisure foregone. While we do not develop 
comparative dynamics for R* here, they may be derived in much the same 
manner as in the cross-sectional framework (Fields and Mitchell 1984).
Some features o f the intertemporal budget set should be underscored. 
First, the older worker’s budget set is defined over all possible retirement 
dates rather than at just one moment in time. A complete understanding 
of the rewards for continued work therefore requires that one investigate 
not only one or two points on the budget surface, but all alternatives. Sec­
ond, to be able to compute PDVY  at each age, one must understand the 
private pension and Social Security benefit formulas facing a given work­
er, since these institutional rules impart structure to the intertemporal 
budget set. Third, the income-leisure trade-off embodies expectations 
about future income streams and formulas, inflation rates, mortality 
rates, and a host o f other variables. These must also be modeled in empiri­
cal work.
9.2 Building the Empirical Intertemporal Budget Set
To construct an intertemporal budget set, we require complete data on 
each worker’s earnings, private pension benefits, and Social Security 
benefits. The data set used in the present empirical analysis is a subsample 
of the Benefit Amounts Survey (BAS) developed in 1978 by the U.S. De­
partment o f Labor’s Pension and Welfare Benefits Program.6 This survey 
consisted o f a stratified random sample of private sector pension plans fil­
ing reports with the Labor Department as required under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The firms whose pen­
sion plans were selected for analysis were asked to provide a limited 
amount o f information on the beneficiaries; data collected at the firms in­
cluded birth year, year o f retirement, and tenure with the firm for each 
sample worker. Individual records were then merged with administrative 
data from the Social Security Administration so that each worker’s file 
also contained his earnings history from 1951 on.
The sample o f workers available for analysis consists o f 8,733 men born 
in 1909 or 1910. This limited age cohort was selected because, by the sur­
vey date (1978), virtually all would have been retired, yet relatively few 
would have died and therefore been excluded from the sample.
6. A data appendix describing empirical computations in more detail is available from 
the authors on request.
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For the analysis at hand, we must know the rules determining pension 
benefits. We constructed such information from union contracts and 
summary plan descriptions on file with the U.S. Department o f Labor for 
fourteen defined benefit plans. No larger data set with information on 
both pensions and their beneficiaries is now available; the present analysis 
thus extends our own previous efforts as well as those o f other analysts 
who have generally been limited to an examination o f a single pension 
plan.7 On the other hand, our sample o f pension plans is still small enough 
that findings reported here must be viewed as exploratory rather than re­
presentative o f pension plans as a whole.
The plans represented here cannot be identified individually for confi­
dentiality reasons. We may say, though, that our sample includes several 
blue collar plans negotiated with the United Auto Workers, several other 
plans in the manufacturing sector, a craft union plan, and one in the trade 
sector.
An example of the benefit rules used in one o f the United Auto Workers 
plans is given in table 9.1. Even this apparently simple years-of-service 
formula turns out to be quite complex in practice.
The formula given in table 9.1 describes pension benefit rules in effect 
around 1970, at which time our sample workers were about sixty years of 
age. But the rules in 1970 would not necessarily have been appropriate for 
a worker who waited to retire until, say, 1975. In this company, and in the 
other companies in our study, the pension formulas were incremented sev­
eral times during the 1960s. In evaluating what future retirement benefits 
would have been, workers in that company might reasonably have expect­
ed that benefits would rise in the future as much as they had in the past. 
Therefore we looked at prior union contracts, the Bureau of Labor Statis­
tics Pension Digest, and other documents to determine what had occurred 
prior to 1970. Empirical analysis o f changes in pension benefits over time 
for newly retiring workers, as well as for previously retired individuals, re­
vealed that pension plans typically raised benefits in line with inflation for 
workers not yet retired, but held nominal benefits constant for those al­
ready retired. Therefore, the empirical model assumes that a prospective 
retiree would have expected nominal preretirement increases just short of 
the inflation rate, but probably zero postretirement increases.
The specific pension formula outlined in table 9.1 depends only on age 
and years o f service. To compute pension amounts in plans where earn­
ings are also used in the benefit formulas, it is necessary to know what a 
worker would have earned had he remained on his job. Earnings informa­
tion is also needed, of course, in constructing the total lifetime income 
available from alternative retirement strategies.
7. See, for instance, the work of Burkhauser 1979 and Fields and Mitchell 1984 on the 
United Auto Workers, and Burtless and Hausman 1982 on federal government workers.
275 Rewards for Continued Work
Tuble 9.1 Private Pension Structure in Company X
Benefit Benefit Benefit at 65
until 62 until 65 and Beyond
Retire after 60“ $4,800 $5,400 $2,548
Retire after age 62b — $5,400 $2,944
Retire after age 65c — — $3,214
Note: The pension structure in company X is negotiated every three years and written 
into a contract with the United Automobile Workers union (UAW). The plan is noncon­
tributory. The benefit formula negotiated in the early 1970s, when the sample workers 
were about sixty years of age and were presumably deciding when to retire, varied 
depending on age and/or years of service. The above figures applied to an individual 
who started work at company X at age thirty.
“This benefit is available only after completing ten years of service. Calculated as 
($90 x years of service less [.04 x the difference between the retirement age and 
62]) + $63.60.
T h is  benefit is available only after completing ten years of service. Calculated as 
($90 x years of service) + $63.60.
“Calculated as ($90 x years of service) + $63.60.
Information on earnings is available from the BAS-Social Security 
earnings data merged file. For the period prior to retirement, earnings in 
excess o f the Social Security taxable maximum are imputed using a vari­
ant o f a routine described in Fox (1976). Earnings a worker could antici­
pate if he did not retire are imputed from previous years’ real earnings fig­
ures. Gross earnings are then reduced by income taxes and payroll taxes to 
obtain net earnings.
The other element of the intertemporal budget set is Social Security 
benefits. These are computed based on the Social Security rules in effect 
in 1972. We use 1972 benefit rules for retirement plans being devised in 
1970, because future changes had been legislated two years in advance. 
The algorithm incorporates what the worker might have anticipated had 
he retired earlier and filed for benefits when first eligible at age sixty-two, 
and what he would have received if he had postponed retiring and filing 
for benefits until later ages. As with the projection o f future private pen­
sion benefits, this requires an assumption about how benefits would have 
been expected to change over time. The algorithm incorporates the real 
growth rate in Social Security benefits experienced during the 1960s as the 
best estimate o f how real benefits might have been expected to change 
during the 1970s.
One limitation of the Social Security computation should be noted. It is 
possible to estimate only the male’s Social Security benefits, but not his 
spouse’s benefits, since marital status information is not reliably reported 
in our file.
In moving from the annual budget set components (all of which are in 
nominal dollars) to present discounted values (which are much more in­
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formative if expressed in real dollars), several additional assumptions 
must be made. Standard practice is followed by discounting each year’s 
benefits by the probability of mortality at each age, based on survival rate 
information for the cohort in question. In addition, future benefits are 
deflated by two factors—inflation and a real discount rate. Estimated fu­
ture benefit streams assume continuation o f the rate of price increases 
prevailing in the early 1970s; to discount benefits accruing in the future, 
the same nominal rate is used. In addition, a 2 percent real discount rate is 
used to reflect time preference. Confirmatory analysis with other discount 
rates produces results virtually identical to those reported below.
The foregoing describes the construction o f the budget set in the BAS 
file. In the balance of the chapter we summarize this information by cal­
culating the overall budget set and its components for a specific “illustra­
tive worker.”8 We do this for purposes o f comparison, since it is useful to 
derive benefits using the same basic earnings and job tenure characteris­
tics, while holding constant other factors that might vary across plans. 
Nonetheless, this illustrative individual should be relatively similar to ac­
tual workers in the pension plan, since benefit structures are generally 
constructed with a relevant salary range in mind. The illustrative worker 
discussed below is assigned the mean net earnings and job tenure derived 
from the underlying sample described above. The average tenure figure, 
twenty-six years, is compatible with Hall’s (1982) recent discussion of life­
time jobs among males in the U.S. labor force. Others who have comput­
ed pension benefits (e.g., Lazear 1982; KotlikofF and Smith 1983) did not 
have this type o f individual-level information and were thus required to use a 
range of tenure and salary assumptions to represent most possibilities.
9.3 The Economic Rewards for Deferring Retirement
As discussed earlier, two empirical questions guide our empirical explo­
rations: (1) How do total income profiles change as workers age? and (2) 
How do pension plans reward continued work effort? Each question is in­
vestigated in turn in this section.9
9.3.1 The Shape o f the Total Income Path (PDVY)
Table 9.2 displays the elements o f the illustrative worker’s intertem­
poral budget set, expressed in annual terms in the top panel and in present 
discounted value terms in the lower panel.10 Expected income amounts are 
reported only until age sixty-five in this relatively aggregative table, since 
some firms prohibited employment after that age; disaggregated figures
8. Readers of our earlier work should be alerted to the fact that those papers use actual 
workers in a company, not the illustrative worker used here.
9. The calculations in this section assume that the illustrative worker is single. Alterna­
tive calculations assuming that he is married yield identical qualitative conclusions, except 
for one point noted below.
10. All present discounted value figures are reported in 1970 dollars.
Table 9.2 Earnings, Social Security, and Private Pension Income at Alternative Retirement Ages, for the Illustrative Worker
If Retirement Occurred at Age
60 61 62 63 64 65
A. Annual Amounts (nominal dollars)
1 . Net earnings (£,) $ 0 8,254 8,717 9,185 9,563 9,760
2. Social Security (55,)“ 1,858 1,916 1,973 2,333 2,749 3,209
3. Net private pension (PP,) 2,190 2,350 2,322 2,513 2,724 2,634
B. Present Values of Streams (real dollars)
1 . Net earnings (PDVE) $ 0 7,677 15,203 22,549 29,618 36,269
2. Social Security (PDVSS) 27,887 28,755 29,614 31,013 32,288 33,191
3. Net private pension (PDVPP) 19,071 18,960 19,953 19,493 19,029 18,542
4. Total PDVY $46,958 55,392 64,770 73,055 80,935 88,002
5. Marginal Increases 8,434 9,378 8,285 7,880 7,067
(18%) (17%) (13%) (11%) (9%)
Note: These computations are based on pension algorithms devised for fourteen pension plans and illustrative worker; see text. 
“Assumes worker retires at that age and files then or at age sixty-two, whichever is later.
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for later ages are provided below for those plans in which continued work 
beyond age sixty-five was possible.
Of most interest for the present discussion are the last two lines on table
9.2 (lines B.4 and B.5), which report total PD V Yand marginal changes as 
retirement is deferred. The following features of the expected PDVY  
stream are noteworthy:
1. PDVY rises monotonically as retirement is deferred. At each age, 
earnings plus (or minus) pension and Social Security accruals exceed the 
pension and Social Security benefits foregone. In real terms, a worker 
postponing retirement from age sixty to sixty-five would roughly double 
his real income stream.
2. PDVY rises nonlinearly with age o f  retirement. The payoff to work­
ing one additional year is highest in both dollar and percentage terms be­
tween ages sixty and sixty-one; if the same worker deferred retiring be­
tween sixty-four and sixty-five, his dollar gain would be about $1,400 less, 
for a marginal percentage gain only half as large.
Therefore, the data show that the economic rewards for postponing re­
tirement are positive but that the gains vary across ages. Previous studies 
have not discerned these patterns because they used data containing less 
detail on the components o f PD VY. ,
The fact that the intertemporal budget set for older workers rewards de­
ferred retirement implies that observed income for any particular retiree is 
a function o f when he chooses to retire, rather than being exogenously 
given. If one wishes to assess income opportunities that would have been 
available to a retired worker prior to his retirement, it is necessary to de­
velop an intertemporal budget set such as the one in table 9.2 indicating 
the magnitudes o f contingent income flows at alternative retirement 
dates.
The observed pattern o f the budget set for the BAS sample also implies 
that the value of PDVY  (or its component parts) at any one particular age 
will not be very informative about the overall shape of workers’ intertem­
poral income paths. Unfortunately, most data sets other than the BAS 
contain insufficient detail on earnings, Social Security, and private pen­
sion benefits, making it difficult to develop a PDVY  path in as much de­
tail as here."
On average, workers in the fourteen plans have very similar earnings 
and Social Security streams. The main source o f variation arises in the pri­
vate pension streams. These differences are elaborated below.
9.3.2 The Shape o f Private Pension Income Paths
Pension benefits constitute a fairly significant source of income for 
older workers who participate in these plans. The top panel o f table 9.2 1
11. Approximations are possible using the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey; see 
Fields and Mitchell 1984.
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shows that annual (first-year) benefits from private pensions are sizeable, 
equaling or exceeding the single worker’s Social Security payments for all 
ages but sixty-five, where they are only slightly less.12 Net private pension 
benefits amount to one-quarter to one-third of after-tax earnings for indi­
viduals in the sample.13
Still focusing on annual benefits, line A .3 indicates large differences in 
benefits depending on when the worker retires. On average, an age-sixty 
retiree would have received private pension income of about $2,200 in the 
year he retired. If he deferred retirement by one year, the addition to 
(nominal) benefits would be on the order of 7 percent. However, the mar­
ginal pension payoff to an additional year’s work is by no means uniform 
across retirement ages; for example, benefits at age sixty-two are lower 
than for age sixty-one. This benefit decline is attributable to pension plan 
supplements provided until a retiree attains age sixty-two, the age o f eligi­
bility for Social Security. A reduction is again evident between the ages of 
sixty-four and sixty-five; the pension rules thus acknowledge that workers 
can file for full Social Security retirement income at age sixty-five and pro­
vide a bridge for individuals retiring earlier. In general, the marginal pen­
sion payoff to retiring one year later varies a lot across retirement ages, a 
fact not immediately evident from a cursory review of benefit rules.
Line B.3 of table 9.2 converts the annual pension benefit figures into 
present discounted values in real dollars. Again it is evident that the re­
ward structure built into private pensions varies for different retirement 
ages. The illustrative worker would receive more in lifetime benefits if he 
left th^ firm at age sixty than if he postponed retirement to age sixty-one, 
despite the fact that annual benefits are higher at age sixty-one than at sixty. 
In fact, the annual pension benefits are increased at less than actuarially 
neutral rates at several ages, as is evident from computed changes in the 
present values o f lifetime benefits:
Change in Retirement Age
60-61 61-62 62-63 63-64 64-65
Change in PD VPP 0% + 5% -2 %  -2 % -2 %
Clearly the structure of lifetime pension income flows very much affects 
the economic rewards for continued work.
12. For a married worker, the sum of the worker’s plus spouse’s Social Security benefits 
exceeds private pension benefits.
13. Previous studies have not computed after-tax replacement rates both for private pen­
sions and Social Security, so these figures cannot be directly compared with others in the lit­
erature. We find that the overall replacement rate including both pensions and a single retir­
ee’s Social Security benefit is between 50 and 60 percent on average, though in some cases 
individuals received as much as 95 percent of preretirement net earnings. Replacement rates 
would be higher if spouse benefits were included.
280 Olivia S. Mitchell/Gary S. Fields
Present values in table 9.2 are averages across fourteen pension plans, 
so they conceal potentially interesting differences in company pension 
structures. Table 9.3 splits the sample into two groups: pattern and con­
ventional plans. Pattern plans are pensions where benefits are based al­
most exclusively on years of service with the firm (or occupation, if a craft 
union). Conventional plans, more common among nonunion firms, de­
termine benefits based both on final salary and tenure with the firm.
It is evident from table 9.3 that the overall means obscure some key dif­
ferences between the two kinds of benefit structures. Pattern plans tend to 
structure their first-year benefits so that they rise more or less smoothly, 
reaching a peak at age sixty-four; annual benefits typically fall for work­
ers deferring benefits beyond that point. First-year benefits in conven­
tional plans operate differently; in this case, benefits for the age-sixty-two 
retiree are lower than for the worker leaving one year earlier. It is this sub­
group of plans that produces the dip in annual benefits found in the over­
all mean. However, after age sixty-two, conventional plans tend to pro­
vide ever-increasing benefit amounts for workers postponing retirement 
up to age sixty-five.
An examination o f discounted pension values in these two types of 
plans suggests even sharper contrasts. Pattern plans (line B.2) actively dis­
courage work beyond age sixty.14 An employee in a pattern plan who de­
fers retirement until age sixty-five will in fact receive lifetime benefits that 
are about 18 percent lower than he would have received had he retired at 
age sixty! On the other hand, present value streams in conventional plans 
are structured so that a worker deferring retirement until age sixty-five re­
ceives about 17 percent higher benefits than if he retired at age sixty. Thus 
between ages sixty and sixty-five, conventional pension plans appear to 
improve benefits by about the same amount that pattern plans reduce 
them.
Clearly, the overall incentives differ between the two types o f plans. To 
see whether marginal incentives are smooth or erratic, changes in pension 
present values are computed for each additional year o f work:
Change in Retirement Age
60-61 61-62 62-63 63-64 64-65
Pattern plans change in 
PDVPP -2 % -2 % -5 % -5°7o -5°7o
Conventional plans 
change in PD VPP + 2% + 1 4 % + 0% + 0% + 0%
Evidently, pattern plans actively encourage early retirement, whereas con­
ventional plans strongly encourage work up to age sixty-two. After age
14. This is similar to the finding reported by Lazear 1982.
Table 9.3 Net Private Pension Amounts at Alternative Retirement Ages in Pattern and Conventional Plans
If Retirement Occurred at Age
60 61 62 63 64 65
A. Annual Net Pension Benefits*
1. Overall mean $ 2,190 2,350 2,322 2,513 2,742 2,634
2. Pattern plan mean 2,653 2,760 2,907 3,059 3,214 2,626
3. Conventional plan mean 1,728 1,939 1,883 2,103 2,356 2,639
B. Present Value of Net Pension Benefits1*
1. Overall mean $19,070 18,960 19,953 19,493 19,029 18,542
2. Pattern plan mean 24,795 24,192 23,787 22,617 21,432 20,275
3. Conventional plan mean 14,777 15,036 17,078 17,150 17,227 17,243
Note: This table is based on pension algorithms of fourteen plans as applied to the illustrative worker (see text). 
•Nominal dollars.
‘Real dollars.
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PDVPP
Fig. 9.2. Present value of private pension benefits in pattern plans and
conventional plans.
sixty-two, conventional plans provide a flat payoff schedule for addition­
al years of work; in pattern plans, the slope becomes strongly negative (see 
figure 9.2).
Table 9.4 disaggregates to the level of the individual plan. This break­
down of pension plan benefit structures reveals even more variability in 
economic rewards for continued work. These plan-specific data permit 
the computation of benefit streams for ages beyond sixty-five in cases 
where continued work was permitted; firms with mandatory retirement 
are indicated with a dash.
This disaggregative investigation of pension plan rules suggests two 
conclusions:
1. Pension plans reward deferred retirement differently from one com­
pany to the next. Pattern plans as a whole, and the UAW plans in particu­
lar, encourage early retirement by structuring benefits so that they attain a 
maximum between ages sixty and sixty-two. Conventional plans are more 
complex, but as a rule structure their benefit flows to reward continued 
work well beyond age sixty.
2. Marginal payoffs to deferred retirement are uneven; actuarial neu­
trality across retirement ages is rare. In our sample, a worker deferring re­
tirement by one year could have increased his lifetime pension income 
flow by as much as 14 percent, or reduced it by 5 percent, depending on 
the pension plan in which he worked.
In overview, then, some private pensions reward prolonged work and oth­
ers penalize it, both in overall and marginal terms. It is not true that pen­
sions always discourage work beyond age sixty.
Table 9.4 Present Values of Net Private Pension Benefits for Alternative Retirement Ages: Plan-Level Data
If Retirement Age Occurs at Age
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
A. Pattern Plans
UAW plans
Plan A $28,181 27,586 27,189 25,455 23,787 22,195 21,706 21,140 20,500
Plan B 36,030 36,146 36,599 36,341 35,730 34,987 34,081 — —
Plan C 28,176 27,571 27,189 25,455 23,787 22,195 — — —
Plan D 28,176 27,571 27,189 25,455 23,787 22,195 21,706 21,140 20,500
Non-UAW plans
Plan E 21,858 19,814 17,912 16,147 14,512 13,001 11,608 10,328 9,153
Plan F 6,351 6,464 6,641 6,850 6,986 7,079 6,620 6,156 5,692
B. Conventional Plans
Plan G 0 0 9,300 10,027 10,087 10,497 9,461 8,891 7,951
Plan H 13,527 14,176 20,471 19,364 18,173 16,869 — — —
Plan I 16,410 16,709 16,841 16,977 17,028 16,893 — — —
Plan J 20,012 20,256 20,270 19,335 18,359 17,246 16,190 15,081 13,841
Plan K 14,851 15,079 15,290 15,504 16,318 17,174 16,563 15,866 15,109
Plan L 17,671 19,669 21,594 23,468 25,295 26,981 — — —
Plan M 16,526 17,042 17,668 18,291 18,810 19,084 — — —
Plan N 19,491 17,254 15,193 14,230 13,742 13,198 12,605 11,592 10,950
Note: This table is based on pension algorithms as applied to illustrative worker; see text. Underlined numbers are row maxima. Dashes indicate 
retirement is mandatory in that plan at that age.
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9.4 Conclusion
The notion o f an intertemporal budget set facing older workers flows 
from an economic model of choice o f retirement age subject to income 
and time constraints. Measuring the budget set empirically requires that 
total discounted income be computed for each possible retirement age. In 
so doing, it is important to model Social Security and private pension 
rules defining benefits available at each age, and in addition to determine 
how workers would have expected these rules to change in the future.
Using a unique new data set known as the Benefit Amounts Survey, we 
develop empirical answers to two questions: (1) How do workers’ total in­
comes change as they defer retirement? and (2) Do private pension struc­
tures reward or penalize continued work at older ages?
The data suggest two important features o f the discounted total income 
streams (PDVY) facing older workers, which have not been noted in pre­
vious studies. First, PDVY rises monotonically as retirement is deferred. 
This is the result o f rising Social Security and earnings streams balanced 
against flat or declining private pension streams. Second, PDVY rises 
nonlinearly with age. In general the economic rewards to postponing re­
tirement are always positive but the gains vary depending on the, age in 
question.
The data also point to two new conclusions about the incentive struc­
tures o f private pension plans. First, pension plans reward deferred retire­
ment differently across companies. Second, marginal payoffs to deferred 
retirement are uneven; actuarial neutrality across retirement ages is un­
common. Some private pensions reward prolonged work but others pe­
nalize it.
The patterns just noted have implications for both researchers and poli­
cymakers. Analysts interested in modeling and estimating the determi­
nants o f retirement, savings, and other economic behavior among older 
workers must build and examine the intertemporal budget sets anticipated 
by individuals as they age. Similarly, income distribution studies should 
recognize that actual retirement income among retirees is determined to a 
significant degree by workers’ retirement behavior. These considerations 
highlight the importance of developing new data sets containing more 
complete information on workers, their earnings histories, and their com­
pany records, including pension system rules. In particular this chapter 
has shown that evaluating older individuals’ incomes requires devising 
data sets quite different from those used by social scientists in the past. 
Conventional worker-level or even household-level surveys collected over 
short periods o f time cannot provide detail sufficient to compute accurate 
measures o f Social Security benefits and private pension opportunities. 
Instead what is required is a new and more creative matching o f data on 
workers, their entire work histories, and characteristics o f the firms em­
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ploying them throughout their lifetimes. Ideally such data would also in­
corporate other needed measures on employee health, wealth, and demo­
graphic traits especially important for the study of income and aging.
The observed differences in pension patterns also have an interesting 
policy implication. One proposal that has received some attention o f late 
in policy circles is the idea that the federal government should mandate 
pension benefit neutrality. This proposal is motivated by the belief that 
pension structures currently encourage early retirement. It is thought that 
mandatory pension neutrality would result in higher benefits for those 
continuing to work beyond age sixty, thereby encouraging longer work­
force commitment. However, our analysis shows that the actual result de­
pends on the benefit structure presently available to the covered employ­
ee. In pattern plans, the effect o f mandatory neutrality would probably be 
to cut early benefits rather than to increase later ones. Though this would 
affect retirement ages in the anticipated direction, retirement benefits 
would be lower than at present, not higher.
In conventional plans, on the other hand, mandatory neutrality could 
conceivably remove the desired incentives currently in place to defer re­
tirement; such a result would not be consistent with federal efforts to en­
courage later retirement. Altering pension reward structures currently in 
place could produce other undesirable results as well. If the current pen­
sion benefits patterns are structured in accordance with firms’ perceptions 
of the relative efficiency o f older workers compared to younger ones, im­
posing regulatory restrictions would be expected to increase firms’ costs, 
some part o f which would probably be passed on to workers in the form 
of lower wages or lower pension benefits. Both the welfare and the effi­
ciency costs o f mandating pension neutrality should be analyzed much 
more carefully before concluding that such a policy is desirable.
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